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One of the major differences between markets that follow a “sharing economy” paradigm and traditional
two-sided markets is that the supply side in the sharing economy often includes individual nonprofessional
decision makers, in addition to firms and professional agents. Using a data set of prices and availability of
listings on Airbnb, we find that there exist substantial differences in the operational and financial perfor-
mance of professional and nonprofessional hosts. In particular, properties managed by professional hosts earn
16.9% more in daily revenue, have 15.5% higher occupancy rates, and are 13.6% less likely to exit the market
compared with properties owned by nonprofessional hosts, while controlling for property and market char-
acteristics. We demonstrate that these performance differences between professionals and nonprofessionals
can be partly explained by pricing inefficiencies. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence that nonprofes-
sional hosts are less likely to offer different rates across stay dates based on the underlying demand patterns,
such as those created by major holidays and conventions. We develop a parsimonious model to analyze the
implications of having two such different host groups for a profit-maximizing platform operator and for a
social planner. While a profit-maximizing platform operator should charge lower prices to nonprofessional
hosts, a social planner would charge the same prices to professionals and nonprofessionals.
Key words : Platforms, two-sided market, sharing economy, behavioral economics, revenue management,
hospitality, amateurs, professionals.
1. Introduction
Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s most popular
media owner, creates no content. Alibaba, the most valuable retailer, has no inventory. And
Airbnb, the world’s largest accommodation provider, owns no real estate. Something interesting
is happening.”
—Tom Goodwin, in “The Battle is for the Customer Interface” (Goodwin 2015).
The widespread adoption of Internet infrastructure and smartphones has reduced the transaction
costs associated with individuals sharing and trading their idle resources and capacity. This has
1
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enabled innovative business models that provide services using distributed capacity contributed by
independent contractors. In some cases, the agents ultimately providing the service are nonprofes-
sional individuals who share their spare resources, giving rise to the trend often referred to as “the
sharing economy”, which revolutionized various industries in the past years.
Most of the sharing economy business models, such as Uber (https://www.uber.com/) and
Airbnb (http://www.airbnb.com), are based on digital platforms (Parker et al. 2016) that connect
individuals who possess excess resources with individuals who need resources, creating two-sided
markets (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005, Eisenmann et al. 2006). On one side of the market, the plat-
form “contracts” the service with the customers. On the other side, independent service providers
deliver the service using their own assets. Frequently, the platform simply acts as an intermediary
and does not directly employ the service providers nor has any ownership or control of the assets
that are used to provide the service.
Without the need to invest on physical assets or maintain a large internal workforce, many of
the sharing-economy platforms scale up quickly. In December 2014, Airbnb had a global portfolio
of one million listings, exceeding the capacity of the largest hotel groups in the world—Hilton,
InterContinental and Marriott.1 On the other hand, platforms are limited in the tools they can use
to manage their capacity. While Marriott can decide how many rooms are offered at which prices in
each market, Airbnb cannot make that type of decisions. The independent providers (hosts, in this
case) decide whether they want to offer their properties to the market as well as the quantity and
price. This represents a change of paradigm from traditional service models where such decisions
are made within the boundaries of the firm by professional decision makers. This paper studies the
implications of this change of paradigm represented by the sharing economy.
In particular, we focus on one of the critical differences between sharing economies and some
of the traditional two-sided markets (e.g., credit card markets, software markets), which is that
in the sharing economy the supply side often consists of both professional (experienced) players
and nonprofessional (inexperienced) players. For example, on Airbnb.com, there are professional
rental service providers as well as “amateurs” who rent out their apartments occasionally.2 Studies
in behavioral economics have found that nonprofessionals are more likely to suffer from behavioral
biases such as loss aversion (Mayer 2001), limited attention (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009), and
overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2008). These behavioral anomalies often change the predic-
tion of traditional models based on complete rationality, as seen in recent operations management
modeling literature (e.g., see Su 2008 and Huang et al. 2013). If the paradigm of the sharing econ-
omy involves a shift towards services provided more and more by nonprofessionals, it is crucial to
1 Airbnb will soon be booking more rooms than the worlds largest hotel chains. Quartz. January 20, 2015.
2 Airbnb in the city. New York State Office of General Attorney. October, 2014.
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understand how their biases translate into market outcomes, and what interventions may improve
market efficiency. In this paper, we empirically study the performance and behavioral differences
between professional and nonprofessional agents, and we explore their implications for the delivery
of services using business models that are based on the sharing economy.
We develop a software procedure to scrape listing data from Airbnb.com for all stay dates in
a four-month period from December 1, 2012 to March 31, 2013 in the Chicago area. We classify
hosts according to the number of properties they list on the site. We call nonprofessional hosts
those who only list one property through Airbnb, and professional hosts those who list multiple
properties, which represent 18% of hosts in our sample. We then compare the performance of pro-
fessional and nonprofessional hosts using performance metrics commonly used in the hospitality
industry, including average daily revenue, occupancy rate and price. We find substantial discrepan-
cies between professional and nonprofessional hosts. All else being equal, a property managed by
a professional host earns 16.9% higher average daily revenue, and has a 15.5% higher occupancy
rate, despite being offered for the same number of days per week at similar average price.
To understand the stability of the market, we ping the URLs of these listings one and half year
later and find a high turnover rate: 49% of previously available listings have exited the market. In
particular, properties managed by non-professional hosts are 13.6% more likely to exit the market,
everything else being equal.
We then explore the source of these discrepancies. We show that they are in part explained by
the pricing inefficiencies of nonprofessional hosts. While professional hosts are more likely to offer
different prices across stay dates based on the underlying demand level, which results in higher
occupancy rates and revenues, nonprofessional hosts fail to do so. In particular, nonprofessionals
fail to respond to surges in demand by charging higher prices for major holidays such as Christmas
and major conventions occurring during the period of analysis, such as the Chicago Auto Show.
During the Christmas and the Chicago Auto Show periods, total sales in the area were up by
98% and 23%, respectively, compared with other dates in the same month, and the occupancy
rate went up by 84% and 21%, respectively. During those periods, nonprofessionals failed to offer
higher prices and earned less. The price increases of non-professionals were 8 .5% and 2.1% lower
than those of professionals during the Christmas and Chicago Auto show periods respectively,
controlling property-level fixed effects. The revenue increases of non-professionals were 19 .8% and
11.8% lower during the Christmas and Chicago Auto show periods respectively.
We also find that both professional and nonprofessional hosts engage in minimal dynamic price
adjustments across the booking horizon. That is, they almost never adjust prices upward nor
downward even when the property is not rented out a few days prior to the stay date. Note that
this is in contrast to the common practice in the hotel industry, where the prices for a given stay
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date often experience substantial changes along the booking horizon based on time left and changes
in customer willingness-to-pay.
The inferior performance and high exit rate of nonprofessional hosts can pose a long-term threat
to the sustainable growth of sharing economy platforms. To understand the impacts and potential
remedies, we incorporate our empirical findings into a classic two-sided market revenue management
model (Armstrong 2006). We show that under standard assumptions about demand functions, the
platform should charge a lower fee to nonprofessional hosts to induce more supply-side participants
and to optimize profit. In contrast, the social planner’s optimal strategy would be to charge the
same price to both professional and nonprofessional agents, because lowering prices will make the
platform’s serving costs overweight the customers’ utility gains. Moreover, the optimal profit of the
platform decreases in the operational discrepancy between professional and nonprofessional agents.
This suggests that the platform could consider interventions that assist hosts adjust their prices
more efficiently, such as the price recommendation tool recently launched by Airbnb.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Literature Review
Sharing economy business models are capturing an increasing attention from the academic com-
munity. Recent work has studied what drives owning vs sharing (Benjaafar et al. 2015, Horton and
Zeckhauser 2016), how to create successful matches in the sharing economy (Cullen and Farronato
2014), how to manage distributed, self-scheduling capacity (Cachon et al. 2015 , Gurvich et al.
2015), or how to design and operate urban bike sharing programs (Kabra et al. 2015).
Within in this line of research, some has explored the context created by Airbnb, one of the
most prominent platforms in the sharing economy. For example, Zervas et al. (2014) study the
effects of Airbnb on hotel revenues, Fradkin (2014) analyzes the consequences of search frictions
using internal data from Airbnb, and Edelman et al. (2015) study racial discrimination using a
field experiment on Airbnb. Our work contributes to this emerging stream of literature.
As a new form of two-sided market, sharing economy business models inherit important traits
from the traditional two-sided markets: network externalities. That is, each side of the market
benefits from the presence of the other (David 1985, Farrell and Saloner 1985, Katz and Shapiro
1985, and Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). However, sharing economy markets can be less efficient
due to the presence of nonprofessional service providers, who are more likely to be subject to
behavioral constraints. The focus of our work is on understanding the differences in behavior of
professional and nonprofessional service providers, and the consequences for the market.
Behavioral differences between amateurs and professional players have received a considerable
amount of attention in the behavioral economics literature. For example, using observational data,
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Mayer (2001) show that investors outperform homeowners in the real estate market because home-
owners exhibit larger loss aversion in pricing their properties. List (2003) demonstrates, with a series
of field experiments, that professional players outperform amateurs in the card-trading market
due to endowment effects. List (2004) later shows that this performance gap shrinks when non-
professional players gain more experiences in the market. DellaVigna (2009) surveys the empirical
literature on behavioral anomalies and the resulting performance discrepancies between profes-
sional and nonprofessional players. Our work considers similar discrepancies between professionals
and nonprofessionals and their impacts, but in the context of the sharing economy. Given that the
sharing economy represents a general paradigm shift towards nonprofessional service providers, it
is particularly important to understand the implications of their behavioral differences on market
outcomes.
Our work is also closely related to 1) service operations literature which considers human inter-
actions in service contexts (e.g., Buell et al. 2015, Frei and Morriss 2012); 2) behavioral operations
literature which studies bounded rationality and its implications on operational decisions (e.g., Su
2008 and Huang et al. 2013); and 3) revenue management literature which studies theory and prac-
tice of demand- and capacity-based revenue management (Netessine and Shumsky 2005, Talluri
and Van Ryzin 2006, Jerath et al. 2010), particularly in the hospitality industry (Anderson and
Xie 2011, Bodea et al. 2009, Lederman et al. 2014). We find that there are substantial differences
in the way revenue management tools are implemented by professional and nonprofessional agents,
which translate into significant differences in market outcomes.
2.2. Hypotheses Development
As mentioned above, past research in behavioral economics shows that professional players have
superior financial and operational performance compared to nonprofessionals in traditional mar-
kets. We hypothesize that nonprofessionals will have inferior financial and operational performance
in the Airbnb market as well. In particular, we define our metrics as follows. Let Revenue it repre-
sent the total revenue that property i collects for stay dates within time interval t. We can write
Revenueit as
Revenueit = NumDaysOfferedit×DailyRevenueit,
where NumDaysOfferedit is the number of stay days that property i is offered during time inter-
val t, often determined exogenously before pricing decisions are made. DailyRevenue it measures
average daily revenue conditional on being offered. We use DailyRevenueit to measure property i’s
host’s financial performance, as opposed to total revenue, i.e., Revenue it, because we do not want
to penalize a host merely because he decides to offer the property for fewer days. Note that our
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definition of DailyRevenueit is parallel to the Revenue Per Available Room (RevPAR), a perfor-
mance metric commonly used by hotels. RevPAR is defined as total room revenue divided by the
number of rooms available and the number of days available during the period under consideration.
We hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. A property managed by a professional host has higher average daily revenue
than a property managed by a nonprofessional host, everything else being equal.
If Hypothesis 1 is supported, we are also interested in identifying the main channel through which
professionals earn higher daily revenue. It could be that professional hosts have higher occupancy
rates, or that they can charge higher average rent prices (controlling for property and market
characteristics), or both. We can rewrite the daily revenue as the combination of those channels,
and test them independently:
DailyRevenueit = OccupancyRateit×AverageRentPriceit
where OccupancyRateit is the occupancy rate for property i in time interval t, calculated as the
number of days occupied divided by the total number of days offered, and AverageRentPrice it is
the average price at which property i is rented out during time interval t (which is calculated using
the prices listed on the days in which the property was rented).
Several past studies have shown that one of the major differences between professional and
nonprofessional agents in traditional markets is that professional agents are more likely to reach a
deal (Mayer 2001 and List 2003). This allows us to hypothesize as follows.
Hypothesis 2. A property managed by a professional host has a higher occupancy rate than a
property managed by a nonprofessional host, everything else being equal.
Similarly, Hypothesis 1 can also be driven by the fact that professional hosts have a higher
average rent price, i.e., average price when a property is rented out. This could be true, for example,
if being a professional host signals better service quality. Consequently, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. A property managed by a professional host has a higher average rented price
than a property managed by a nonprofessional host, everything else being equal.
Besides merely testing whether the direction established in Hypotheses 2 and 3 is supported by
the data, we are interested in their relative magnitude so that we can identify the main driver
of better revenue performance of professional hosts, if Hypothesis 1 is supported. The following
equation sums up our three hypotheses:
Revenueit = NumDaysOfferedit×
Hypothesis 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
OccupancyRateit×
Hypothesis 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
AverageRentPriceit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hypothesis 1
.
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Finally, we are interested in not only the temporary operational and financial performance of
different hosts, but also the consequences of such differences on market dynamics in the long term.
As suggested by the economics literature (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg 2003), one of the important
long-term metrics of two-sided markets in defining market efficiency is the number of suppliers in
the platform, which, in our case, is closely related to agents’ exiting behavior. Since nonprofessional
agents may suffer from behavioral anomalies and receive lower than expected revenues, they are
probably more likely to exit the market, possibly in favor of other options, for instance, selling
the property in the real estate market or renting the property in the long-term rental rather than
short-term rental market.3 Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4. A property managed by a professional host is less likely to exit the market than
a property managed by a nonprofessional host, everything else being equal.
3. Empirical Setting and Data
3.1. Empirical Setting: The Airbnb Platform
To study the differences in behavior between professionals and nonprofessionals, we use data from
Airbnb. Airbnb is a sharing-economy platform that connects hosts with empty rooms to potential
renters. Hosts on Airbnb list their spare rooms or apartments/houses and determine their own
daily prices for rentals. Users visit the Airbnb website to search for desirable accommodations.
Founded in 2008, the Airbnb’s marketplace has experienced tremendous growth in the last few
years. As of 2014, there are more than one million properties worldwide and 30 million guests who
use the service. Like other traditional two-sided markets, Airbnb earns revenues from both sides.
In particular, guests pay a 9% to 12% service fee on average for each reservation, depending on
the length of stay and the location, while hosts pay a 3% service fee to cover the cost of processing
payments by Airbnb. Currently, Airbnb’s business model operates with little to no regulation in
most locations. As a result, it becomes a major concern, for some local governments such as New
York City, that professional rental businesses use Airbnb to avoid taxes, and this has been the
subject of intense policy debates.4 The main focus of our study is not to contribute to the ongoing
debate about regulation in Airbnb, but to use data from the platform as an example to study
differences in behavior between professionals and nonprofessionals that can be relevant in other
sharing-economy platforms as well.
We classify Airbnb hosts in two types: 1) inexperienced individuals who list their spare rooms
or apartments/houses for rent, which we denote as nonprofessional hosts, and 2) professional
3 We restrict our attention to properties offered as entire apartments or houses and exclude those properties where
the hosts also reside, so that we focus on a relatively homogeneous group of hosts with similar levels of mobility.
4 “Airbnb, New York State Spar Over Legality Of Rentals.” NPR. October 16, 2014.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Professional Hosts in Our Sample and Their Revenue.
The first row shows that 18% of all hosts list two or more properties (entire apartments) on Airbnb in our data.
These hosts are classified as professional hosts. Those hosts account for 24% of all properties in our sample and earn
33% of the total revenue across all properties in our sample period.
agents who manage multiple properties at the same time, which we denoted as professional hosts.
In this paper, we define professional hosts as those who offer two or more unique units on Airbnb.
Our results do not change qualitatively if we follow the definition by New York State Attorney
General’s office and define hosts as professional hosts if they hold three or more unique units. 5
Figure 1 shows that, in our sample, among hosts who offer entire apartments for rent, 18% are
professional hosts with at least two properties. The professionals who constitute these 18% hold
24% of all properties in our sample and account for 33% of all revenue in our sample period.6
3.2. Airbnb Data: Listings and Transactions
To conduct this study, we developed a software procedure to scrape listings around the Chicago
area on Airbnb.com for stay dates ranging from December 1, 2012 to March 31, 2013. This time
horizon has the advantage that it is not affected by the presence of automatic pricing tools that
have been developed more recently, so it is adequate to study differences in agent behavior. The
procedure works as follows: (1) the program logs on to Airbnb.com to search for available rooms in
the Chicago area; (2) the program then follows the link to each listing and records the information
about that listing, such as location, room type, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, guest
reviews, identify of the host, etc.; (3) for each listing, the crawler searches for availability and price
of all stay dates during the four-month travel period. To capture at least one month worth of
availability and price history for each listing on each stay date, the program was run on a daily
basis from November 1, 2012 until March 31, 2013. In order to study the entry and exit of Airbnb
5 “Airbnb In The City”. New York State Office of The Attorney General. October, 2014.
6 Note that there are professional hosts who own properties in multiple cities but only one of them is in our sample,
which covers the Chicago area. Those hosts are still classified as professional hosts. This explains why the percentage
of properties in our sample owned by professional hosts (24%) is lower than 2 ∗ 18% = 36%.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Listings
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Price ($) 24,845 149.99 79.65 10 600
Rented 24,845 0.27 0.45 0 1
NumReviews 24,845 10.99 15.23 0 150
AvgRating 17,179 9.61 0.55 8 10
NumBathrooms 23,055 1.29 0.62 1 5
NumBedrooms 24,140 1.58 0.89 1 6
hosts, we re-scraped Airbnb.com 18 months later, in August 2014. Since Airbnb does not reuse the
host ID, we can identify hosts who had delisted their properties and exited the market.
We restrict our attention to offerings of an entire house or apartment and exclude those offerings
with just a part of a property. This is because hosts who provide just a room or a bed in their house
or apartment tend to have different demographics, incur different costs of renting and sometimes
rent their rooms out for different reasons (such as social reasons). We also focus only on listings
targeting short-term stays rather than long-term stays (listings with minimum length of stay less
than a week).
Documenting differences in listings between different types of hosts is informative in itself, but
we also use calendar listings to impute bookings from dynamic changes in listing availability. Based
on descriptions on Airbnb’s website, when a property is unavailable for a stay date, either booked
or not offered, the price is not displayed in the calendar. For example, if we observe on December
10th that a property is available at $149 for the night of December 11th, it means that it has not
been booked for the stay on December 11th and it is available as of December 10th. On the other
hand, if a price was displayed on booking date December 9th for a stay on the 11th, but it is no
longer displayed on December 10th, it implies that the property was booked for December 11th on
December 10th.
Table 1 gives a summary of all offerings, where an offering is defined as the combination of
property and stay date. Price is the last observed price along a 30-day booking horizon prior to
the date of stay. Rented is equal to 1 if the property is rented out for the stay date. The table also
displays observable property characteristics, including number of reviews, average ratings, number
of bathrooms, and number of bedrooms.
Inferring availability and transactions from the calendar data has some potential limitations
and requires some assumptions. First, a property could become unavailable in the calendar and
be classified as “booked” because the host no longer wants to offer the property for a particular
night, and not because the property has been booked. Even though one cannot completely rule
out such possibility, we believe that imputing transactions in this way offers a reasonable proxy
for real bookings. Given that we focus on listings for an entire house or apartment rather than
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a single room or bed at a property, the chance that a property owner delists a property due
to personal reasons is significantly reduced because the owner does not reside at the property.
Moreover, given that we focus only on short-term rentals and Airbnb is the leading existing short-
term rental marketplace for individual properties, the chance that a property is rented out through
other channels is also greatly reduced.7 Second, a property could appear as “available” from the
calendar but could actually be unavailable. This could happen, for example, when the host has not
updated the calendar to reflect the actual availability of the property, in what Fradkin (2014) refers
to as a “stale vacancy”. Note that having access to internal data would not solve this problem.
Because the focus of this paper is to understand the differences between the behavior of profes-
sional and nonprofessional hosts, the aforementioned issues could be problematic if they affected
professional and nonprofessional hosts differently. In the next subsection we present a comparison
of professional and nonprofessional hosts and we report the results of two tests that suggest that
these issues do not affect the two types of hosts differently.
3.3. Comparison of Professional and Nonprofessional Hosts
Table 2 displays summary statistics at the weekly level for professional and nonprofessional hosts,
respectively. The first part of the table simply shows the variables summarized in Table 1, for
professional and nonprofessional hosts, aggregated at the weekly level. The second part of the table
includes additional variables calculated at the weekly level. We do not observe any significant differ-
ence in the number of days offered per property per week between professional and nonprofessional
hosts. It appears clear though, even before conducting any statistical analysis, that properties man-
aged by professional hosts on average earn more per week, obtain a higher occupancy rate, and
are less likely to exit the market. However, such discrepancies in performance can be driven by the
fact that professional hosts offer more spacious properties (more bedrooms and more bathrooms),
have more reviews (though they are not necessarily rated higher), and perhaps even are located in
more popular districts. The rest of the paper studies this performance discrepancy systematically,
introducing the relevant control variables in the analysis.
As discussed above, although calendar listings are measured accurately (and are interesting on
their own), bookings and availability inferred from them could be misrepresented. If this phe-
nomenon affected professionals and nonprofessionals differently, this could bias some of our results.
To alleviate this concern, we describe evidence from two additional analyses that suggest that this
is not the case.
7 In Section 5, we focus on the subset of hosts who make their properties available more than four days per week
(50% of the time). Because of the high availability of their properties, it is less likely that these hosts will cancel
availability for other reasons. We do not find any qualitative differences in our results by focusing on this subsample.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Professional and Nonprofessional Hosts at Weekly Level
Professional Hosts Nonprofessional Hosts
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Average Price ($) 167.87 83.35 146.94 99.5
Occupancy Rate 0.31 0.38 0.27 0.35
NumReviews 12.63 15.47 11.39 17.26
AvgRating 9.36 0.63 9.69 0.51
NumBathrooms 1.45 0.88 1.24 0.52
NumBedrooms 2.02 1.19 1.47 0.78
Daily Revenue ($) 44.66 63.91 34.22 65.04
NumDays Offered 5.89 1.94 5.79 2.02
NumWeekdays Offered 4.22 1.56 4.12 1.64
NumWeekends Offered 1.67 0.54 1.67 0.54
Exit 0.28 0.45 0.57 0.50
† Exits are measured 18 months later from the original data collection period.
First, we have partnered with PriceLabs, a provider of pricing tools for vacation rentals, to study
anonymized records from a random sample of 300 Airbnb listings belonging to both professional
and nonprofessional hosts. The data includes actual bookings as well as availability updates, which
allows us to compare actual bookings with bookings inferred from availability changes. For each
property in the sample, we measure the calendar inaccuracy rate as the fraction of days where
the calendar data would suggest there was a booking but there was no actual booking. While the
bookings inferred from the calendar information are not always accurate, there is no statistical
difference in the accuracy for professional and nonprofessional hosts.
Second, Cui et al. (2016) conduct a randomized field experiment in which they send accommo-
dation requests to a random set of listings in Chicago, and track the hosts’ responses. While the
purpose of that experiment is to study discrimination, analysis of the data using the available (and
exogenous) variation in the host status (professional vs nonprofessional) does not indicate a sta-
tistically significant difference in calendar misrepresentation for professional and nonprofessional
hosts in their sample.
Based on these two analyses, we believe that, even though there may be a mismatch between
actual and imputed bookings, our results are not subject to systematic biases (either towards
professional or nonprofessional hosts) due to such mismatch.
4. Performance of Professional vs Nonprofessional Hosts: Econometric
Specifications and Results
In this section we describe the overall methodology of our analysis, the construction of our variables,
and the corresponding empirical results. We follow the order in which we develop the hypotheses,
starting with the analysis of daily revenue (Hypotheses 1), and following with the occupancy rate
and average rent price (Hypotheses 2 and 3, respectively), and the assessment of the robustness of
the results. Finally, we analyze the effects on exit probability (Hypothesis 4).
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4.1. Daily Revenue
In Hypothesis 1, we would like to understand how the daily revenue from renting out a property
depends on whether the property is managed by a professional or a nonprofessional host. We focus
on the daily revenue, DailyRevenueit, which we average at the weekly level. There are two reasons
why we construct our revenue measure in this way. First, as mentioned above, normalizing total
revenue by the number of days each host makes their properties available allows us to tease out
the effect of predetermined availability and focus on the performance metric driven by endogenous
decisions such as pricing. Second, we choose the aggregation level at the weekly level because we
want to construct our measure in a relative homogeneous period for each host and, at the same
time, average out the day-of-week effect. We use a family of reduced-form specifications and model
daily revenue as,
log(DailyRevenueit) = C0 + α1Professionali + βXit + vm + vt + ²it
where log(DailyRevenueit) is the natural log transformation of daily revenue for property i in
week t, Professionali denotes whether the property is owned by a professional host. We control for
various confounding factors that may potentially correlate with both the daily revenue (i.e., the
dependent variable) and the host status (i.e., the treatment). First, we use zip-code-level and week-
level fixed effects, vm and vt, to control for the possibility that certain markets are more attractive
to travelers and meanwhile are also populated with more professional hosts.8 Second, we control
for the characteristics of an offering, denoted by Xit, which includes the physical characteristics
of the property (i.e.,the number of bedrooms and bathrooms) and the quality of service (i.e., the
number of guest reviews, the average review ratings, and the average response time of the host).
Moreover, we control for the rank of an offering in the search result. If a host’s professional status
(or factors correlated with it) is used as an input to the Airbnb’s search-engine ranking algorithm,
then professional-host status can be correlated with performance through rank.
Hypothesis 1 holds if α1 > 0, which indicates that properties managed by professionals have
higher daily revenue than those managed by nonprofessionals. The value of the coefficient α1 gives
the magnitude of the impact of the host type on daily revenue. Since we control for zip-code-level
and week-level fixed effects, the identification of α1 is enabled by the variation of daily revenue
among all properties within a zip-code and a week, while controlling for offering characteristics.
Table 3 shows the estimates obtained under different sets of control variables. Column 1 only has
market and time fixed effects. Column 2 controls for the physical characteristics of the properties
8 Ideally, we would like to use a fixed-effect model to control for a listing’s specific characteristics. However, since our
independent variable of interest (i.e., whether a property is managed by a professional or a nonprofessional host) is
time-invariant, including fixed effects in our model would absorb the effect of the variable of interest.
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Table 3: Hypothesis 1 (Revenue)
Dependent variable:
LogDailyRevenue
(1) (2) (3)
Professional 0.233∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗
(0.072) (0.074) (0.073)
NumWeekends −0.232∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
NumBathrooms 0.070 0.209∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074)
NumBedrooms 0.018 −0.028
(0.051) (0.050)
NumReviews 0.020∗∗∗
(0.002)
Rank −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Observations 4,297 4,297 4,297
R2 0.142 0.143 0.185
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
ResponseTime, Week-level and zip-code-level dummy included
in addition to the fixed effects. Column 3 further includes the quality of service in the control
variables.9 All three columns show that α1 is significantly greater than zero. Hence, our empirical
evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Properties managed by professional hosts on average earn
higher daily revenue than properties managed by nonprofessional hosts, with the magnitude being
16.9% in the specification reported in Column 3.
4.2. Occupancy Rate and Average Rent Price
The fact that professional hosts earn higher daily revenue (Hypothesis 1) can be attributed to them
having a higher occupancy rate (Hypothesis 2), or a higher rent price (Hypothesis 3), or both. In
this section, we evaluate the two channels and discuss their relative importance.
We start by testing our second hypothesis, which suggests that a property managed by a profes-
sional host will have a higher weekly occupancy rate than one managed by a nonprofessional host.
We employ the same model specifications as in the previous section:
log(Occupancyit) = C0 + α2Professionali + βXit + vm + vt + ²it,
where log(Occupancyit) is the log transformation of the weekly occupancy rate of property i in
week t, and all the other variables are defined as before.
9 We did not find a significant effect of average rating due to its lack of variation. Moreover, average rating is missing
when there is no review available, which will limit the number of observations when included. Therefore, we decide
to drop average rating in our analyses.
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Table 4: Hypothesis 2 (Occupancy Rate)
Dependent variable:
LogOccupancyRate
(1) (2) (3)
Professional 0.173∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.068) (0.070) (0.070)
NumWeekends −0.283∗∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
NumBathrooms −0.048 0.078
(0.070) (0.070)
NumBedrooms −0.034 −0.076
(0.048) (0.047)
NumReviews 0.020∗∗∗
(0.002)
Rank −0.0004∗∗
(0.0002)
Observations 4,297 4,297 4,297
R2 0.143 0.144 0.186
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
ResponseTime, Week-level and zip-code-level dummy included
Table 4 shows the estimates obtained under different sets of specifications. In all columns, α2 is
significantly greater than 0, which supports Hypothesis 2. Specifically, properties managed by pro-
fessional hosts achieve 15.5% higher occupancy rates than properties managed by nonprofessional
hosts, based on the estimates reported in Column 3.
Besides higher occupancy rate, do professional hosts also charge higher prices? We next evaluate
the difference of rented price between professional and nonprofessional hosts. We adopt the same
specification structure as above, changing the dependent variable to AvgRentPrice it:
log(AvgRentPriceit) = C0 + α3Professionali + βXit + vm + vt + ²it.
Table 5 shows the estimates with different specifications. In Columns 2 and 3, α3 is not sig-
nificantly greater than 0, and the magnitude of the point estimates are small as well, therefore
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. That is, professional hosts do not seem to charge a higher rental
price on average. Since the dependent variable is calculated using the prices of properties that are
rented, our results indicate that customers do not have a higher willingness-to-pay for properties
managed by professional after controlling for the quality of the property and the service offered.
This also alleviates potential concerns regarding to omitted variable biases.
Recall that Column 3 of Table 3 indicated that professional hosts on average earn 16.9% more
revenue, controlling for property and market characteristics. We have shown that the additional
revenue primarily comes from higher occupancy rates rather than higher rented prices.
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Table 5: Hypothesis 3 (Average Rent Price)
Dependent variable:
LogRentPrice
(1) (2) (3)
Professional 0.108∗∗∗ 0.032 0.022
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
NumWeekends 0.092∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
NumBathrooms 0.240∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
NumBedrooms 0.115∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
NumReviews −0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Rank −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Observations 2,313 2,313 2,313
R2 0.288 0.438 0.444
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
ResponseTime, Week-level and Zip-code-level dummy included
4.3. Robustness Tests for Model Specifications and Endogeneity
In this section, we formally address the potential concern of omitted variable bias, even though
it seems unlikely from the previous results on rented price. One may argue that, for example,
properties managed by professional hosts might be closer to transportation stations and therefore
are more likely to be rented. Although some of these effects are accounted for by controlling for
guest reviews, there may still be unobserved variables that are correlated with both the host
type and the performance of a property, and hence lead to biased estimates. Moreover, the linear
specification may not be accurate either.
We perform two major tests to alleviate concerns related to model specification and endogeneity.
First, we use a propensity score matching estimator to address concerns related to our linear
specification. Second, in addition to using our matching estimator, we conduct Rosenbaum bound
sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum 2002). This analysis studies how the estimates would change in
presence of unobserved confounding factors of varying magnitudes. This allows us to determine
how strongly an unmeasured confounding factor must affect the selection into treatment in order
to undermine the conclusions about causal effects from a matching analysis, and in turn addresses
concerns related to potential omitted variable bias.
We construct a matching estimator based on propensity scores with a generic search algorithm
to optimally balance covariates (Sekhon 2008). In particular, for Hypotheses 1 and 2, the two
hypotheses supported by previous empirical analyses, we match observations based on the char-
acteristics of offerings and their locations (zip-codes). Table 6 shows the results. Each column of
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Table 6: Matching Estimator and Rosenbaum Bounds
Daily Revenue Occupancy Rate
(Hypothesis 1) (Hypothesis 2)
Original Treatment Effect 0.169∗∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.072) (0.068)
Matching Treatment Effect 0.315∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.091)
Lower Bound for γ = 1.5 0.116 0.154
Upper Bound for γ = 1.5 0.516 0.554
Tipping γ 2.0 2.0
Note: ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 6 corresponds to one hypothesis. For each hypothesis, we present the original estimator of
the treatment effect and our propensity-score-based matching estimator. The direction and signifi-
cance level of the matching estimator do not differ significantly from original ordinary least-squared
estimator. The magnitudes are even higher when we use the propensity score matching approach.
Therefore, we conclude that our results are very unlikely to arise from the specific choice of model
presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
We then perform the Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis suggested by Rosenbaum (2002). The under-
lying idea is to measure how the estimated effect changes when an omitted confounding factor
is present in the treatment selection. Given a certain level of odds ratio of treatment selection,
we compute the upper and lower bounds of the average treatment effect. Table 6 shows how our
matching estimator could change if two units with similar observed covariates could differ in their
odds of receiving the treatment (i.e., having a professional host), when the unobserved confounding
factor drives as much as 50% of the treatment selection (i.e., γ = 1.5). The table shows that in all
cases the lower and upper bounds of the matching estimators have the same sign as the original
estimators, which shows that even a hidden confounding factor that drives 50% of the treatment
selection will not alter our conclusion. We present the tipping point of the treatment selection
parameter γ, which is defined as the lowest γ such that the measured treatment effect would have
its sign flipped. In this case, the hidden confounding factors have to make selection into the treat-
ment twice as likely as into the control group in order to alter the support for our hypotheses,
which is highly unlikely. Besides the Rosenbaum bounds, we also estimate the Heckman endoge-
nous treatment model (Heckman 1976 and Wooldridge 2010) that allows selection into treatment
to be based on unobservables and we arrive at the same conclusion that the discrepancy we see
between professionals and nonprofessionals is not likely driven by unobserved confounding factors.
4.4. Exit Probability
Given that the performance of nonprofessional hosts is inferior to that of their professional coun-
terparts, are properties managed by nonprofessional hosts also more likely to exit the market after
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Table 7: Hypothesis 4 (Exit)
Dependent variable:
Exit
(1) (2) (3)
Professional −0.744∗∗∗ −0.632∗∗ −0.599∗∗
(0.283) (0.290) (0.299)
NumBathrooms 0.026 −0.043
(0.312) (0.319)
NumBedrooms −0.330 −0.302
(0.207) (0.211)
NumReviews −0.019∗
(0.010)
Rank −0.0002
(0.001)
Observations 317 317 317
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
ResponseTime, Zip-code-level dummy inlcuded
a certain period of time? The literature on the two-sided markets suggests that the revenue of
the platform and the social welfare depend critically on the size of the supply side (Armstrong
2006). Therefore, exit probability is an important measure to consider in analyzing the health and
growth of any sharing-economy marketplace. We use a family of Logit specifications to test this
hypothesis. In particular, we model the exit rate of a property as:
Exiti = logit(C0 + α4Professionali + βXi + vm + ²i),
where Exiti indicates whether property i has exited Airbnb’s market 18 months after the original
sample period. All the other variables are as previously defined.
Table 7 shows the results. Under all three specifications the estimates of α4 are statistically
significantly negative, which supports Hypothesis 4. Computing the marginal effects from estimates
in Column 3, we conclude that a property owned by a professional host is on average 13 .6% less
likely to exit the market after one and half years, measured by marginal effect at the means.
5. Understanding the Differences in Performance
In Section 4 we provided empirical evidence that properties managed by professional agents have
higher daily revenue as well as occupancy rates, and are less likely to exit a market compared with
those managed by nonprofessional hosts. In this section we examine the source of these differences
in performance. We do so by analyzing the potential pricing inefficiencies of nonprofessional hosts,
including insufficient price adjustments and inadequate response to well-known demand shocks. We
then test whether alternative explanations are plausible for the observed performance discrepancy.
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Figure 2: Example: Number of Price Levels Offered Across Stay Dates and Booking Dates
In the example, last observed prices for stay dates in the week are either $150 or $175, therefore StayDateRateCnt=1.
Along the 30-day booking horizon, there are three price levels for Monday night stay ($160, $155 and $150), two price
levels for Friday night stay ($160 and $150), and one price level for all other stay dates. Therefore, BookingDateR-
ateCnt=0+2+0+0+0+1+0=3.
5.1. Intensity of Pricing Activity
The revenue management (RM) literature (Talluri and Van Ryzin 2006, Gallego and Van Ryzin
1994, and Bitran and Caldentey 2003) has extensively documented the use and impact of various
RM techniques in an array of industries providing perishable products or services, one of which
being the hotel industry (Zhao and Zheng 2000). According to this literature, there are two RM
tools widely adopted by hotels when setting room rates: (1) variable room rates across stay dates
(Talluri and Van Ryzin 2006): hotels offer different room rates based on the day of the week, the
season, or other observable factors affecting total demand; (2) variable room rates across booking
dates (Su 2007): hotels offer different room rates based on time left to the stay date. We therefore
define two measures of the intensity of pricing activity: (1) StayDateRateCntit, calculated as the
total number of last observed price levels for all stay dates in week t minus 1. The last observed price
equals to the rented price if a property is rented out eventually, or the listing price last observed
along the booking horizon otherwise. StayDateRateCntit = 0, for example, means that there is
no price variation across stay dates in week t because the last observed prices are constant. (2)
BookingDateRateCntit. We first calculate the number of price levels along the 30-day booking
horizon for each stay date in week t minus 1. We then take the sum of this measure over all stay
dates in week t. BookingDateRateCntit = 0 indicates no price variation across booking dates for
any stay date in week t, as listing prices are constant. Figure 2 provides an example of how these
two measures are calculated.
We first test in our context whether the use of such RM tools, as captured by the aforementioned
variables, indeed leads to higher revenue. In particular, we hypothesize that a property’s weekly
revenue is higher if it has higher StayDateRatesCnt and BookingDateRatesCnt for that week. We
test the hypothesis with the following model specifications:
log(DailyRevenueit) = C0 + θ1StayDateRateCntit + θ2BookingDateRateCntit
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Table 8: Impact and Use of Revenue Management Techniques
Dependent variable:
LogRevenue LogOccupancyRate StayDateRateCnt BookingDateRateCnt
OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professional 0.124∗∗ −0.217
(0.053) (0.133)
StayDateRateCnt 0.328∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.006)
BookingDateRateCnt 0.002 −0.0002
(0.007) (0.001)
NumBathrooms 0.151∗∗ −0.001 0.178∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.069) (0.009) (0.063) (0.143)
NumBedrooms 0.005 −0.002 −0.159∗∗∗ −0.126
(0.045) (0.006) (0.042) (0.095)
NumReviews 0.022∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.002) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.004)
Rank −0.0004∗∗ −0.00000 −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Observations 4,743 4,743 4,743 4,743
R2 0.134 0.127
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Response Time, Week-level and Zip-code-level dummy included
+ βXit + vm + vt + ²it,
log(OccupancyRateit) = C0 + θ3StayDateRateCntit + θ4BookingDateRateCntit
+ βXit + vm + vt + ²it,
All variables are as previously defined. The coefficients of interest are θ1, θ2, θ3, and θ4. θ1 > 0 and
θ2 > 0 suggest that variable rates by stay date and by booking date lead to higher daily revenue
respectively, while θ3 > 0 and θ4 > 0 suggest variable rates by stay date and by booking date lead to
higher occupancy rates respectively. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show that a more intense pricing
activity results in higher daily revenue and occupancy rates, controlling for property and market
characteristics. The effect is mainly driven by the use of variable rates by stay date. We did not find
significant revenue and occupancy effects of variable rates by booking date, which can be partially
driven by lack of adoption of this practice — we observe that 75% of listings did not adjust their
prices at all along the booking horizon and 95% of them adjust their prices at most once along the
booking horizon.
Given that a more intense pricing activity leads to better performance, the next question is
whether professional hosts indeed engage more in such practice and earn higher revenues in turn.
In order to test this, we use Poisson model to analyze the levels of pricing sophistication:
StayDateRatesCntit = Poisson(C0 + θ5Professionali + βXit + vm + vt + ²it),
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BookingDateRatesCntit = Poisson(C0 + θ6Professionali + βXit + vm + vt + ²it),
Column 3 of Table 8 shows that θ5 is positive and significant, which indicates professional hosts
vary property prices more often based on the date of stay. Computing the marginal effect, we
find that properties managed by professional hosts vary prices 4.9% more frequently, calculated as
marginal effect at mean. Since θ6 is non-distinguishable from zero in Column 4, it indicates that
professional hosts do not necessarily adjust their prices more often along booking dates, which may
be driven by the lack of engagement in dynamic pricing across booking dates by all hosts.
Overall, we have shown that a more intense pricing activity results in higher occupancy rates
and higher daily revenue. The fact that professional hosts are more likely to engage in intense
pricing activity may partially explain their superior performances in this market. The evidence
so far provides a mechanism (more intense price adjustments) through which Hypothesis 1 and 2
(higher daily revenue and occupancy rates for properties managed by professionals) may hold.
5.2. Response to Specific Demand Shocks
The results indicates that there are likely opportunities missed (i.e., revenue lost) by nonprofessional
hosts, because they offer a relatively constant price across stay dates and do not respond to demand
changes in the market as often as they should. To verify this conjecture more concretely, we identify
specific, well-known demand shocks during our sample period. In particular, we focus on major
holidays and events that all hosts could be equally aware of, including Christmas and the Annual
Chicago Auto Show. In those periods, we first verify that demand is indeed higher. We then
test whether professional hosts and nonprofessional hosts react to such predictable demand surges
differently. In other words, do nonprofessional hosts fail to raise their prices for high-demand travel
dates, and how much do they sacrifice in revenue as a consequence?
Christmas Season: We define Christmas season as Dec 24th to Dec 31th and non-Christmas
season as the rest of December. We first note that demand during Christmas is indeed higher
than that during the non-Christmas season. The upper-left panel of Figure 3 shows that during
the Christmas season, average daily sales and average occupancy rate (that is, demand relative to
supply) are nearly twice as high as those during the non-Christmas season in the Chicago area.
According to the classic RM practice in the hotel industry (Talluri and Van Ryzin 2006), hosts
should charge higher prices during the Christmas season and obtain higher daily revenue as the
demand is higher. The upper-right panel of Figure 3 shows the average prices of properties man-
aged by professionals and nonprofessionals during the Christmas and non-Christmas seasons. For
illustration purpose, we subtract all average prices by the average prices during the non-Christmas
season for professional and nonprofessional hosts, respectively. The chart shows that, on average,
both professional and nonprofessional hosts charge higher prices during the Christmas season,
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Figure 3: Demand Signal: Christmas Season and Chicago Auto Show
(a) Demand Difference (Christmas Season) (b) Pricing and Revenue Difference (Christmas Season)
(c) Demand Difference (Chicago Auto Show) (d) Pricing and Revenue Difference (Chicago Auto Show)
Panels (a) and (c) show the total number of rented properties and average occupancy rates across all hosts for the
different stay days in our sample. Panel (a) compares the days during the Christmas Season (Dec 24th to Dec 31th,
2012) with the other days in December 2012 (Dec 1st to Dec 23rd, 2012), while Panel (c) shows the days during the
2013 Chicago Auto Show (Feb 8th to Feb 19th, 2013) and the other days in February 2013 (Feb 1st – Feb 7th and Feb
19th – Feb 28th, 2013). The positions of the green dots in Panel (b) show the average price differences between the
days during Christmas season and the other days in December 2012 across all professional hosts and nonprofessional
hosts, respectively. The sizes of the dots represent the ratio of daily revenue during the Christmas season over daily
revenue during other days in December 2012. Panel (d) is equivalent to Panel (b), but is used to describe the Chicago
Auto Show period relative to other days in February, 2013.
which is consistent with RM theory and practice. However, the chart also indicates that the price
differences between the Christmas and non-Christmas periods are larger for rooms managed by
professionals. Moreover, we compute the average ratios of daily revenue during the Christmas and
non-Christmas seasons for each property, indicated by the size of the dots in Figure 3. It is clear
that professional hosts are not only more likely to adjust prices in response to higher demand
during Christmas, but they also earn more revenue compared with nonprofessional hosts.
Chicago Auto Show: Another type of demand signals that hotel revenue managers commonly
track is major events in town. One of the largest events in Chicago every year is the Chicago
Auto Show — the largest in North America, held annually in February in downtown Chicago. The
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2013 Chicago Auto Show spanned from February 8th to February 19th. If nonprofessional hosts
fail to react to this demand surge as well, we expect to observe similar patterns as we did for
the Christmas season. The bottom-left panel of Figure 3 shows that both the average daily sales
and the average occupancy rates are higher during the Chicago Auto Show period. Moreover, the
bottom-right panel demonstrates that, on average, properties managed by professional hosts are
more likely to be charged a higher price during the Chicago Auto Show period, and earns higher
revenue as well.
One may be concerned that the discrepancy in price and revenue may simply be driven by
the fact that professional hosts manage more spacious properties or are located in more popular
areas. In order to formally test whether professionals are more likely to adjust prices in response
to demand signals and as a result earn higher revenue than nonprofessionals, we introduce the
following empirical specifications with property fixed effects:
log(ListPriceit) = C0 + κ1Professionali×DemandSignalt + α1DemandSignalt
+ βXit + vi + ²it,
log(DailyRevenueit) = C0 + κ2Professionali×DemandSignalt + α2DemandSignalt
+ βXit + vi + ²it,
where log(ListPriceit) and log(DailyRevenueit) are the log of listed price and revenue of property
i on day t, DemandSignalt indicates whether day t belongs to a particular demand signal, the
Christmas season or Chicago Auto Show. Xit includes the weekend dummy and the time-varying
characteristic, i.e., rank. vi is the fixed-effect of property i.
Results are shown in Table 9, with Columns 1 and 2 for Christmas season and Columns 3 and
4 for Auto Show. Column 1 shows that the price difference for properties managed by professional
hosts during the Christmas versus non-Christmas season is 8.5% greater than that for properties
managed by nonprofessional hosts. Column 2 shows that the revenue difference of properties man-
aged by professional hosts during Christmas and non-Christmas seasons is 19 .8% higher than that
of properties managed by nonprofessionals. Similarly, Column 3 shows that the price and revenue
differences between the Chicago Auto Show period and the rest of the month is 2 .1% and 11.8%
greater for properties managed by professional hosts.
In summary, professionals vary prices more frequently across different stay dates according to
variations in demand. Note that, as summarized in Table 5, there is no systematic price difference
between properties rented by professionals and nonprofessionals on average, across all dates. Our
analysis of the Christmas period and the Chicago Auto Show period suggest professionals are
better at matching prices with specific demand situations. Thanks to this superior pricing ability,
professionals are able to obtain on average a 16.9% higher daily revenue.
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Table 9: Response to Demand Shocks (Christmas and Autoshow)
Dependent variable:
Dec 2012 Jan - Feb 2013
LogListPrice LogRevenue LogListPrice LogRevenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Christmas 0.014∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.039)
Professional:Christmas 0.085∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.071)
Autoshow −0.002 0.131∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.025)
Professional:Autoshow 0.021∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.006) (0.050)
Weekend 0.028∗∗∗ −0.014 0.023∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.003) (0.025) (0.002) (0.017)
Rank −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.00003 −0.002∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.0001)
Observations 5,714 5,714 12,803 12,803
R2 0.049 0.070 0.011 0.014
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Property-level fixed-effect included
5.3. Alternative Explanations
We test two alternative explanations for professional hosts outperforming their counterparts.
5.3.1. Heterogeneous Renting Costs
One could argue that the operational performance discrepancy between professional and nonpro-
fessional hosts could be mainly driven by the difference in the costs they incur when renting a unit.
In particular, if nonprofessional hosts incur higher costs of renting, they will charge higher prices
and in turn have lower occupancy rates and revenues in equilibrium. It could be also be that some
nonprofessionals with very high rental costs are only offering their units when demand is very high
and they can charge a high price. Recall, however, that there is actually no significant difference
in the number of days a unit is offered per month between professional and nonprofessional hosts
according to Table 2. Nevertheless, we conduct an additional test to assess whether our estimates
are affected by the possible difference in rental costs.
If the differences in renting costs were indeed the main driver, we would expect the opera-
tional performance discrepancy between professional and nonprofessional hosts to be substantially
reduced when the analysis is restricted to a subsample of units with more homogeneous renting
costs. We now focus on units that are rented more than 50% of the time on average (i.e., 4 days or
more per week).10 This is likely to eliminate hosts with high renting costs and makes the sample
more homogeneous.
10 For exposition purposes, we show the results for the 50% cutoff point; our conclusion does not change qualitatively
if we increase the cutoff to 70%.
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Table 10: Tests of Alternative Explanations: Renting Costs
Dependent variable:
LogRevenuePerDay LogOccupancyRate LogRentPrice
(1) (2) (3)
Professional 0.164∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.008
(0.074) (0.069) (0.021)
NumWeekends −0.194∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.059) (0.017)
NumBathrooms 0.187∗∗ 0.061 0.237∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.069) (0.021)
NumBedrooms −0.017 −0.067 0.116∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.047) (0.015)
NumReviews 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Rank −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 4,116 4,116 2,227
R2 0.144 0.146 0.389
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
ResponseTime, Weekday-level, week-level and zipcode-level dummy included
We retest Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 with this more homogeneous sample, using the same model
specification as before. As shown in Table 10, our hypotheses that units managed by professional
hosts achieve higher revenue and a higher occupancy rate are still supported. Moreover, the mag-
nitude of the effects are comparable with the results from the whole sample, i.e., a 16 .4% higher
revenue compared with 16.9% previously, a 15.9% higher occupancy rate compared with 15.5%
previously. Therefore, we do not seem to find empirical evidence that the difference in rental costs
between professional and nonprofessional hosts could be the main driver of the observed perfor-
mance discrepancy.
5.3.2. Learning
Another possible explanation for the difference in performance between professionals versus non-
professionals could be different rates of learning. List (2004) finds that consumers learn to overcome
the endowment effect as they accumulate more market experience. In our context, as professional
hosts manage more properties, it is also likely that they observe more demand information in
a given period of time. Hence, professional hosts can learn how to price optimally faster than
nonprofessional hosts, and they in turn perform better operationally and financially.
In order to test whether professional hosts learn faster than nonprofessional hosts, we first define
a measure of learning: the speed at which the expected daily revenue improves over time. Let μi
denote the rate at which property i’s expected revenue increases per day. If daily revenues improve,
this variable will be greater than 0. It can be decomposed into two components: 1) a constant
rate caused by changes in the market, μ, and 2) a room-specific rate εi, which can be influenced
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Table 11: Tests of Alternative Explanations: Learning
Dependent variable: LogRevenue
All Hosts Hosts New to Airbnb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DayNumber 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
DayNumber:Professional −0.0002 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 24,845 24,845 10,204 10,204
R2 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.024
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Month-level dummy, fixed effect.
by host experience. That is, μi = μ + εi. If professional hosts learn faster than nonprofessional
hosts, we expect to observe μP = E[μi|i ∈ P ]− E[μi|i ∈ NP ] > 0, where P represents the set of
professional hosts, and NP represents the set of nonprofessional hosts. In other words, we would
expect the revenues of properties listed by professional hosts to improve at a higher rate. We test
this hypothesis with the following fixed-effect model:
log(DailyRevenueit) = C0 + μt + μP t×Professionali + αProfessionali + βFi + vt + ²it
where log(DailyRevenueit) is the log of the revenue for property i on day t.11 t is measured as
the number of days elapsed from the start of our sample, Dec 1st, 2012. The coefficient of interest
is μP . μP > 0 would suggest that properties managed by professional hosts have a higher rate of
learning.12
Table 11 offers the result. Column 1 estimates the baseline specification without the interaction.
It shows that hosts do learn over time. However, Column 2 shows that properties managed by
professional hosts do not have a higher increasing rate of revenue.
We have assumed so far that the learning rate of each host is constant over time, that is, regardless
of how long a host has been in the market. If professional hosts have operated in the market for
a longer time, then their learning rate will slow down as the learning curve plateaus. In this case,
professional hosts will appear to have a slower learning rate compared with nonprofessional hosts.
In order to address this, we focus on a subsample of hosts who are relatively new to the market.
We use the number of total reviews of a host across his properties as a proxy for his time in the
Airbnb market. By focusing on a subsample of hosts with fewer than 5 reviews when they first
appear in our sample, we restrict our attention to new participants in the market.
11 We add 1 to all Revenueit to avoid infinity after the log transformation.
12 If we exclude the Christmas and Chicago Auto Show periods, the results do not change qualitatively.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 11 show the results. We can see that new market participants on average
learn faster (0.8% revenue increase per day) compared with all participants (0.7% revenue increase
per day). However, the interaction effect in Column 4 shows that new nonprofessional participants
actually learn faster than new professional participants over time. This result is consistent with
the result from List (2004), who shows that nonprofessional traders can correct their loss aversion
biases over time. To sum up, we do not find empirical evidence to support the conjecture that the
better performance of professional hosts is explained by a higher rate of learning.
6. Implications for Platform Owners and the Social Planner
6.1. A Parsimonious Model
Having shown that there are important differences between professionals and nonprofessionals in
terms of behavior and outcomes, we turn our attention to exploring the consequences of these
differences. In particular, we propose a parsimonious model to understand how the difference
between professional and nonprofessional hosts affects the optimal prices charged by the profit-
maximizing platform holder or by a social planner. We use a well-established two-sided market
model from Armstrong (2006) to describe the sharing economy.
Suppose that there are two groups of agents, denoted as 1 and 2. Group 1 represents the hosts
in the market, while Group 2 represents the buyers. As in the previous sections, hosts can be
further divided into two subgroups: professional hosts, denoted as P , and nonprofessional hosts,
or NP . The utility of an agent, following the classic two-sided models (Rochet and Tirole 2003
and Armstrong 2006), is determined in the following way: if the platforms attracts nP1 professional
hosts, nNP1 nonprofessional hosts, and n2 customers, the utilities of the hosts and customers are,
respectively,
uP1 = α1n2− pP1 ; uNP1 = β(α1n2)− pNP1 ; u2 = α2(nP1 + nNP1 )− p2, (1)
where pP1 , pNP1 , and p2 are the prices charged by the platform to professional hosts, nonprofessional
hosts, and customers, respectively. For exposition purposes, we assume those are membership fees
that hosts and customers pay to have access to the platform. In practice, Airbnb charges hosts
and customers per transaction (i.e., a usage model). Rochet and Tirole (2006) have shown the
equivalence of these two models. All the subsequent conclusions, though developed under the
membership model, hold under the usage model as well. The parameter α1 represents how the
utility derived by hosts depends on the number of customers (a reasonable assumption being that
α1 > 0, which implies that hosts obtain a higher utility when there are more customers in the
market). Based on our empirical estimates, nonprofessional hosts obtain less utility for the same
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platform characteristics, given that their performance is lower. We use β to represent, in general, the
performance difference between professional and nonprofessional hosts regardless of the behavioral
driving forces. The higher the β, the better the nonprofessional hosts perform, relative to the
performance of the professional hosts. Based on Table 2, β is around 80% in our empirical setting.
The number of participating hosts and customers is determined by the agents’ participating
utilities in the two-sided market as follows:
nP1 = φ1(u
P
1 ) ; n
NP
1 = φ1(u
NP
1 ) ; n2 = φ2(u2),
where φ1(∙) and φ2(∙) are increasing and concave demand functions.
Last, we define the cost structure for the platform. Suppose that the platform incurs a marginal
cost f1 for serving each host, both professional and nonprofessional, and f2 for serving each cus-
tomer.13 The platform’s profit can be written as
π = nP1 (p
P
1 − f1)+ nNP1 (pNP1 − f1)+ n2(p2− f2),
which is equivalent to
π(uP1 , u
NP
1 , u2) =φ1(u
P
1 )[α1φ2(u2)−uP1 − f1]+
φ1(uNP1 )[β(α1φ(u2))−uNP1 − f1]+
φ2(u2)[α2(φ1(uP1 )+ φ1(u
NP
1 ))−u2− f2]. (2)
Suppose that the hosts’ and customers’ surpluses are vP1 (uP1 ), vNP1 (uNP1 ), and v2(u2) such that
the envelope condition is satisfied: vP1
′(uP1 ) = φ1(uP1 ), vNP1
′(uNP1 ) = φ1(uNP1 ), and v′2(u2) = φ2(u2).
The total social welfare can be defined as
w = π(uP1 , u
NP
1 , u2)+ v
P
1 (u
P
1 )+ v
NP
1 (u
NP
1 )+ v2(u2).
For the above system, we derive the optimal prices that the platform and the social planner
should charge to maximize profit.
6.2. Profit-Maximizing Platform
The following proposition gives the structure of the optimal prices that a profit-maximizing plat-
form would set.
Proposition 1. Given the number of hosts and customers in the market, the profit-maximizing
price satisfies the following equation:
pP1 = f1−α2n2 +
φ1(uP1 )
φ′1(uP1 )
; pNP1 = f1−α2n2 +
φ1(uNP1 )
φ′1(uNP1 )
; p2 = f2−α1n1 + φ2(u2)
φ′2(u2)
.
13 Again, these can be interpreted as “membership costs,” but a model that considers costs per transaction (i.e., a
usage model) would yield the same conclusions, following Rochet and Tirole (2006).
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The structure of optimal prices is similar to that of traditional two-sided market models: the
price of each group i depends on the cost of serving that group, fi, the network externalities of
that group, αjnj , and the elasticity of group participation,
φi(ui)
φ′i(ui)
. For example, for customers, their
serving costs are f2, their network externalities are α1n1 (i.e., the benefit of an additional customer
to all hosts), and their elasticities of participation are φ2(u2)
φ′2(u2)
.
Whether the platform should charge a lower price to the group that is at disadvantage (i.e.,
nonprofessionals) depends on the elasticity of group participation (which depends on the demand
function). Specifically, if φ1(x)
φ′1(x)
is an increasing function of x (which would happen if the demand
were increasing and concave), then pNP1 < pP1 . In other words, under a standard increasing and
concave demand function, the platform’s optimal strategy is to lower the prices for nonprofessional
hosts. The main intuition is that since both professional and nonprofessional hosts are equally
attractive to customers, the platform wants to charge a lower price to nonprofessional hosts, given
that they are less likely to participate (or more likely to exit after trial-out period as we shown in
our data) due to their lower performance.
Moreover, since uP1 (n2, p)−uNP1 (n2, p) = α1(1−β)n2, it is not surprising that the price difference
increases as β decreases. When the performance of the nonprofessional hosts is worse, the platform
has to compensate nonprofessional hosts more, assuming that the demand function is increasing
and concave in utilities. Note that a simple two-part tariff system, in which each host is charged a
base fee for participating and an add-on fee for each additional property, could help the platform
compensate for the performance differences between professional and nonprofessional hosts.
Finally, if the platform can reduce the performance discrepancy between professional and nonpro-
fessional players (i.e., by helping nonprofessional agents become more competitive in the market),
how much could they benefit from this? Since we cannot characterize the profit improvement in
a closed form for general demand functions, we assume a simple and widely used linear demand
model:
φ1(u) = k1u− k2 ; φ2(u) = k3u− k4. (3)
Lemma 1. Given that the demand functions for both hosts and customers are linear, the plat-
form’s profit is increasing in β. In particular,
∂π∗
∂β
=
α1n
∗
2n
∗
1
2
,
where n∗1 and n∗2 are the optimal number of hosts and customers in the system, independent of β.
It is not surprising that the optimal profit is increasing in β: if the nonprofessional hosts perform
better (i.e., β increases), the platform can charge higher prices to nonprofessional hosts and in turn
Li, Moreno and Zhang: Pros vs Joes: Agent Pricing Behavior in the Sharing Economy
29
collect higher profits. This suggests that Airbnb could consider interventions that help nonprofes-
sional hosts dynamically adjust their prices more efficiently, such as the price tip tool launched
by Airbnb on June 4th, 2015.14 The rate at which optimal profit increases with β depends on the
attractiveness of customers to hosts α1 and the size of the system n∗1 and n∗2. The intuition is that,
when customers become more and more attractive, the loss in the number of nonprofessional hosts
due to the operational discrepancy is larger.
6.3. Welfare-Maximizing Social Planner
From the perspective of a social planner, we can characterize the welfare-maximizing prices as
follows.
Proposition 2. Given the number of hosts and customers in the market, the welfare-
maximizing price satisfies the following equation:
pP1 = f1−α2n2 ; pNP1 = f1−α2n2 ; p2 = f1−α1n1.
Surprisingly, the social planner’s optimal strategy is to charge the same price to both profes-
sional and nonprofessional agents regardless of the operational discrepancy. The intuition behind
this result is that the social planner, when deciding prices for one type of host, cares the platform’s
profits as well as hosts’ and customers’ utilities from participating. Since hosts’ and customers’
aggregated utilities is decreasing in prices, the social planner should lower the prices until the incre-
ment gain on participants’ utilities cannot overweigh the increment loss on firms’ costs, even when
β is equal to one. Therefore, when β is less than one, the social planner cannot further lower prices
to nonprofessional hosts since the incremental gain from doing so cannot overweigh the incremental
loss on the platform’s costs. Therefore, the social planner should not charge differentiated prices
to professional and nonprofessional hosts when there is an operational discrepancy.
In sum, there are several insights obtained from combining our empirical results with a well-
established two-sided market model. First, our analysis shows that, under mild assumptions on
demand functions, the platform has incentives to charge different prices to professional and nonpro-
fessional agents. Specifically, the platform’s optimal strategy is to lower the price for nonprofessional
agents to compensate for their loss in the competition. With a conventional linear demand system,
we show that the optimal profit increases in β monotonically. In particular, the increasing rate
depends on the attractiveness of customers to hosts (α1) and the size of the systems (n∗1 and n∗2).
Second, our results show that the social planner, contrary to our intuition, does not want to charge
different prices for different type of hosts.
14 “Using Data to Help Set Your Price.” Airbnb Blog June 4, 2015.
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7. Conclusion
The sharing-economy business model comes with an increase in the use of nonprofessional labor.
We have used Airbnb as the empirical setting to study the implications of this shift towards using
nonprofessional service providers.
We have documented substantial discrepancies between professional and nonprofessional hosts.
All else being equal, a property managed by a professional host earns more than a 16 .9% higher
average daily revenue, has a 15.5% higher occupancy rate. Moreover, properties managed by pro-
fessional hosts are 13.6% less likely to exit the market compared with properties owned by non-
professional hosts, controlling for property and market characteristics. We have shown that these
discrepancies can be rationalized by the pricing inefficiencies of nonprofessional hosts, such as less
frequent price adjustments and inadequate response to instances of high demand.
Finally, we have combined our empirical results with traditional two-sided market models to
show that platforms like Airbnb should charge a lower price to nonprofessional hosts to compensate
for their lower performance or, alternatively, could try to assist nonprofessionals with their pricing
and capacity-management decisions. An example of this is the pricing that Airbnb is currently
providing to its hosts or the “heat maps” that Uber shows their drivers, to indicate areas where
they are more likely to find a customer. Such actions help inexperienced hosts and drivers make
more money, and are also likely to increase the profits of the platform.
Although our empirical analysis has focused on Airbnb, we believe that our results provide
meaningful insights that go beyond this specific setting. Other platforms such as Uber also use
a combination of professionals (e.g., a full-time driver offering a “black car” service) and nonpro-
fessionals (e.g., a student occasionally driving for Uber via their “UberX”). We expect that our
findings, which point to a lower efficiency of nonprofessionals, could play similarly in a service like
Uber. Furthermore, as innovative business models are finding new ways of shifting risks to different
parts of the value chain including final customers (Girotra and Netessine 2014), the inefficiencies
that we observe arising from the use of nonprofessionals could become even more important.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Since both φ1(∙) and φ2(∙) are concave and increasing, the first order condition is necessary for optimal
pricing. Due to envelope theorem, the first order condition of the value function respect to uP1 should be 0:
∂π
∂uP1
=−φ1(uP1 )+ φ′1(uP1 )[α1φ2(u2)−uP1 − f1] + φ2(u2)[α2φ′1(uP1 )] = 0.
Substituting Equation 1:
pP1 = f1−α2n2 +
φ1(uP1 )
φ′1(uP1 )
.
Similarly, using envelope theorems on the value function respect to uNP1 and u2, we can derive:
pNP1 = f1−α2n2 +
φ1(uNP1 )
φ′1(uNP1 )
; p2 = f2−α1n1 + φ2(u2)
φ′2(u2)
.
¥
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Since both φ1(∙) and φ2(∙) are concave and increasing, the first order condition is necessary for optimal
pricing. Based on our assumption that , the optimization problem of the social welfare satisfies the envelope
theorem. Therefore, taking the first order condition of the value function respect to uP1 :
∂w
∂uP1
=−φ1(uP1 )+ φ′1(uP1 )[α1φ2(u2)−uP1 − f1] + φ2(u2)[α2φ′1(uP1 )]+ φ1(uP1 ) = 0,
which implies that
α1φ2(u2)−uP1 − f1 + φ2(u2)[α2φ′1(uP1 )] = 0.
Li, Moreno and Zhang: Pros vs Joes: Agent Pricing Behavior in the Sharing Economy
34
Re-arranging equations and substituting Equation 1:
pP1 = f1−α2n2.
Similarly, using envelope theorems on the value function respect to uNP1 and u2, we can derive:
pNP1 = f1−α2n2 ; p2 = f1−α1n1.
¥
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Based on Proposition 1, it is easy to see that the difference between optimal prices charged on professional
and nonprofessional hosts are constant: pP∗1 − pNP∗1 = (1− β)α1n2. Therefore, solving the optimal prices is
equivalent to solving the following linear system: p
∗
1
p∗2
n∗1
n∗2
=
 0 0 0
α1−α2
2
0 0 α2−α1
2
0
−2k1 0 0 2α1k1
0 −k3 α2k3 0
×
 p
∗
1
p∗2
n∗1
n∗2
+

f1
2
− k2
2k1
f2
2
− k4
2k3−2k2
k4
 (4)
where p∗1 = p
P∗
1 and n
∗
1 = n
P∗
1 + n
NP∗
1 .
Based on Equation 4 can be seen that (1) the optimal prices charged to the professional host p∗1 and
customers p∗2 do not depend on β and (2) the optimal numbers of hosts and customers (i.e., n
∗
1 and n
∗
2) do
not depend on β. Moreover, notice that since the difference in optimal prices charged to professional and
nonprofessional hosts are constant, it is easy to see that nP∗1 = n
NP∗
1 regardless of β. Therefore,
π∗ =
n∗1
2
(pP∗1 + p
NP∗
1 )−n∗1f1 + n∗2(p∗2− f2) = n∗1(p∗1− f1)+ n∗2(p∗2− f2)−
(1−β)α1n∗2n∗1
2
Hence,
∂π∗
∂β
=
α1n
∗
2n
∗
1
2
.
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